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MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF TRAINING (SPECIAL)

SUBJECT: Interviews reports and recommendations relative to
Assessment and Evaluation Branch

PART I

1. Upon assuming our assigned responsibilities on 7 July 1952, it was decided by unanimous consent that a survey of the attitudes and interests of all members of the Assessment and Evaluation Staff should be undertaken before formulation of recommendations for future policy. It was further decided that this end could best be met by asking each member of the Staff to meet with the four senior members of the A&E organization. Consequently, on the afternoon of 8 July, the interviews were begun, and completed, with the exception of two members, the afternoon of 15 July. Enclosure A is a list of the individuals interviewed by day scheduled. [redacted] acted as chairman of the group and each person was encouraged to express any opinions, attitudes or suggestions he or she desired on the basis that they were not committed by any remarks at this time, but that their help was being sought to assist in the ultimate formulation of policy recommendations. Each member of the group including the interviewee was encouraged to ask questions and an attempt was made to have each person describe his present assignment, his attitude towards it, his immediate future plans and his ultimate ambitions.

2. On the basis of these interviews, the following reactions are presented as the result of our interpretation of the attitudes expressed. For convenience, the staff is divided into three divisions. The Professional Staff including [redacted]

[redacted] The Sub-Professional Staff including Messrs [redacted]

The Clerical Staff including [redacted]

THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF

In general, the attitudes of the professional staff may be summarized as willingness to cooperate ranging from without enthusiasm to limited enthusiasm. The specific attitudes are in some cases difficult to describe, but as seen by us are believed to be as follows:

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PART II.

On the basis of our interviews and discussions, the following recommendations and comments are presented for consideration and action:

A. Morale

It is evident that general morale continues at low ebb. The factors contributing to this situation are complex but may be summarized as follows:

(1) Indecision and insecurity on the part of the professional staff due in part to a failure carefully to define professional status and responsibility; indecisiveness as to the possibilities of developing a competent professional program within the CIA administrative framework; lack of time to evaluate adequately procedures and functions; and poor communication channels between A&E consumers and A&E staff.

(2) Lack of understanding and marked insecurity on the part of the sub-professional staff due to a lack of dynamic supervision and leadership; failure to define job goals, opportunities and on-the-job training; lack of rapport between the professional staff and the sub-professional staff; and failure to define a clear personnel policy providing equal status for equal pay and realistic assignments in accordance with pay grade and experience.

(3) Cooperative but somewhat cautious acceptance of change by the clerical staff with problems related to failure to provide realistic supervision; a widespread feeling that the work load is irregular; and an attitude that personnel policies and procedures

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be more clearly defined and made available to all levels of the organization.

Recommendations:

1. That immediate steps be taken by higher authority to reassure the professional staff as to the stability of the assessment, evaluation and testing functions with emphasis on the fact that any planning, re-evaluation and reorganization will be worthwhile and sympathetically received.

2. That official cognizance be directed to a definition of the professional status of psychologists in CIA and that steps be taken to insure that the administrative personnel over A&E have full and unqualified faith in the professional integrity and professional competence of the A&E staff as now constituted.

3. That the A&E staff supervisory personnel be charged with full responsibility for promulgating general personnel policies and procedures with the advice and consent of their superiors which will include realistic job definitions and job assignments as well as promotional possibilities and procedures.

4. That appropriate action be taken to promote the clear understanding that the responsibility for providing dynamic and meaningful supervision and leadership is that of A&E supervisory personnel, but that it also is incumbent upon the supervisory personnel over A&E to provide the climate and circumstances to make such leadership possible.

5. That serious study be made of the feasibility of consolidating the several psychological services within the Agency into a single organization as a means of bolstering the professional status of those engaged in psychological work, assuring a consistent, coordinated program of professional supervision and control, and effecting economies in manpower, in recruiting efforts, and in professional productivity.

B. Recruiting

In order to meet even the present commitments of the A&E staff, it is apparent that replacements must be sought to fill the vacancies created by recent transfers. As is well-known, the problem of recruiting competent, qualified psychologists is difficult at best. However, before effective recruiting can be undertaken, the positions available must be made more attractive from a professional point of view than is now possible. Effective recruiting is possible only when engaged in with sincerity and conviction. Until the morale factors discussed above have been considered and some steps taken to provide implementation of changes, effective recruiting is not possible. However, every

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attempt will be made to survey the available market and re-open contacts so that an intensive recruiting program can be undertaken by 1 September.

Recommendations:

1. That immediate steps be taken to consider qualified candidates for the ultimate assignment as chief of the assessment and evaluation staff or his equivalent. This person should be a highly qualified psychologist whose training and experience has been broad and general rather than narrowly specialized within a single field of psychology. The most important qualification of such a person should be a record of successful experience as administrator of a professional group engaged in work similar to ours.

2. That every effort be made to secure applications from qualified psychologists suitable for integration into an intelligence organization.

3. That as soon as feasible a conference be held with the A&E staff and branch chiefs to discuss recruiting problems and procedures.

C. Assessment:

The assessment process has had a polyglot development. It is the product of many ideas, attitudes and varied experience. Due to the continued emergency nature of its service, there has never been any opportunity to re-evaluate, systematize or streamline the process. It is now apparent that a detailed study of the process in light of its experience and results is necessary and essential. The re-evaluation can only be made by the whole Assessment professional staff operating together and this must be made regardless of cost in time if further service is to be effective and efficient.

Recommendations:

1. That authority be granted to spend the time necessary to re-vamp the Assessment process even if this entails a brief cessation of our service function.

2. That authority be granted and assistance rendered in making it possible to consult with assessment consumers at all levels to evaluate the assessment product and to furnish ideas and attitudes to implement modifications and changes.

3. That cooperation be given toward the establishing of effective liaison with other organizations, both governmental and private, which are engaged in operations or in research in fields related to ours.

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D. Research:

Research and Validation is literally the life blood of a functioning, effective assessment and evaluation program. The systematic follow-up and continuous evaluation of the A&E processes insures a really professional service. Although this has long been recognized, the planning and implementation of this Branch is far behind schedule. Immediate results cannot and should not be expected, but long term and long range planning is essential. A few limited research projects have now been undertaken, but much remains relative to planning. It should be pointed out that every independent survey of the A/E function has pointed out the deficiencies in this area and it can be anticipated that any future survey would continue to serve the Agency for failure to provide this service.

Recommendations:

1. That as soon as the Chief, A&E is selected, steps be instituted to recruit a well-qualified senior psychologist who can provide the kind of professional leadership essential for a functioning and productive research program.

2. That immediate steps be taken by the present R&V staff to describe in detail the essentials of a good research program and that as soon as this is completed it be submitted to higher authority so that the feasibility of the program can be ascertained. This will entail considerable discussion and explanation, the time for which must be made available.

E. Training Evaluation:

The training evaluation function is probably the least understood activity of the A&E framework as now constituted. The strong internal leadership formerly existing there has been dissipated with a resultant serious collapse of morale and esprit d'corps. It will take time and patience to fully comprehend the scope and potentialities of the TEB operation. At the present time, we do not have a psychologist on our staff who has the kind of training most adaptable to the training evaluation function.

Recommendations:

1. That immediate steps be taken in conjunction with Training (S) staff personnel to carefully outline and detail the functions, responsibilities and potentialities of the Training Evaluation Branch in light of new organization and policies.

2. That as soon as the Chief, A&E is selected, steps be taken to select a chief of the Training Evaluation Branch who possesses training

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and experience in the Educational Psychology or Industrial Psychology field.

F. The Overseas Program:

It is our unanimous opinion that any A&E program that does not provide the opportunity for related field experience, is unrealistic and unproductive. Next to the question--and in some respects equal to--the need for a dynamic research program, the need for field experience is both essential and desirable. The implementation of the present overseas program does not augur good future relationships. We want to go firmly on the record at this time that some semblance of control and support must be maintained by the A&E staff. We question that the present staff for overseas assignment is being selected on the basis of motivation and qualifications and the possibility of other than lip-service cooperation is very remote. We feel very strongly that a successful overseas program requires personnel who possess certain special professional skills and motivational attitudes.

Recommendations:

1. That as soon as feasible a policy conference be called to outline the functions and responsibilities of the A&E staff in overseas assessment in which such terms as "professional control" and "professional support" be clearly defined.
2. That until such time as formal policy be defined, the A&E staff be a participant in all phases and planning in the implementation of the current overseas program.

G. Polygraph Training:

There are phases of the polygraph training that are legitimately the function of psychologists. However, there are also areas clearly without the scope of psychology. The supervision and administration of such a course does not appear to be a legitimate function of the A&E staff.

Recommendations:

1. That the A&E staff have no supervisory or administrative control of the Polygraph Course and that any future resumption of the course be under the cognizance of a training activity rather than a staff activity.
2. That A&E continue to furnish professional support where needed and requested by whoever assumes control of the Polygraph course.

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H. In-Service Training:

Presumably, the professional members of the A&E staff need little if any additional formal professional training. However, the unique problems of an Intelligence Organization require that formal and semi-formal procedures be adopted to insure that the members of the Assessment and Evaluation staff have every opportunity to gain current and meaningful information on Intelligence work.

Recommendations:

1. That aid from professional Intelligence personnel be furnished to assist the A&E staff in instituting a seminar or discussion group on the needs, reactions, results and problems of the Intelligence profession as related to the A&E process.



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Acting Chief
Assessment and Evaluation Staff



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Research Branch



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Assessment Branch



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Chief
Training Evaluation Branch

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